A novel method for jointly designing two binary amplitude masks (BAMs) that allow for secure authentication is proposed. The speckle-noise diffraction pattern generated numerically from the input secret image encrypted by a random phase is binarized and further compressed. The resulting BAM can be separated into two desired BAMs, each of which does not visually render the primary information when applied for verification. Simulation results are presented to verify the validity and effectiveness of the proposed method.
Introduction
Since the double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique was proposed by Refregier and Javidi [1] , optical image encryption has been widely studied over the past few decades [2] - [8] . To improve security and enlarge the scopes of its applications, the DRPE technique has recently been integrated with photon-counting imaging [9] - [14] or pixel extraction [15] - [17] for information secure authentication, where sparse data used for verification were produced using double-random-phase encoded data or phase retrieval algorithm. No valuable information can be observed from the decoded image, which presents a secure layer. Optical verification systems are also proposed based on correlator architecture [18] - [21] , moiré effect [22] , and optical interference imaging [23] - [26] . Very recently, an optical verification method has been proposed in the DRPE system based on single-shot imaging without reference wave using binary intensity pattern [27] . Since most of those authentication systems are under the framework of DRPE, complex holographic schemes are usually required to record complex-valued encrypted data used for verification. In addition, multiple spatial light modulators (SLMs) are employed as phase-only displays since at least two phase-only masks appeared in those authentication methods based on DRPE or optical interference.
Phase data, as mentioned above, needs to be holographically recorded (or iteratively computed) and displayed using SLMs in most of the previously proposed verification systems. In contrast, binarized data, e.g., binary intensity pattern for iterative phase retrieving [27] and binary digital holograms for image reconstruction [28] can be produced swiftly with the computer printers. Since the desired patterns contain only two quantization levels, i.e., 0 and 1, it is also possible for us to achieve highly efficient data transmission in addition to improving data storage capacity. In this paper, a double binary amplitude masks (BAMs) structure is designed to implement optically-secured authentication. The security of two BAMs generated by using the proposed algorithm is guaranteed. No information can be visually observed from the two BAMs and their respective diffraction patterns. To the best of our knowledge, double-BAM based optical information authentication system, which is not under the framework of DRPE, has not been reported previously.
Principle
The authentication system is schematically shown in Fig. 1 , where two BAMs generated from a secret image f (x, y) are placed at the object planes in the two symmetric illumination paths. Different from the interference-based image encryption scheme [5] , the structure is designed for information authentication, and the interference pattern is produced by binary masks. Compared with phaseonly masks, the BAMs have the advantages of simple structure, easy fabrication and high data compression. The two beams of light modulated by BAMs are combined coherently to yield a reconstruction at charged coupled device (CCD) plane, which is intended not for direct visualization of the primary image but for authentication by means of optical correlation.
Mathematically, the retrieved signal at CCD plane can be represented by
where || denote modulus operation and FrT d,λ { } denotes Fresnel transform, respectively. The subscripts λ, d denote the wavelength of the illumination laser beams and the propagation distance between BAMs and the CCD plane, respectively. The process of the two BAMs generation will be presented in the following paragraphs. To improve security, the input secret image f (x, y) is encoded by a random phase and then inversely transforms (means virtual propagation backward) to the object plane to obtain a specklenoise distribution
where α(x, y) is a random function between 0 and 1. The encoded Fresnel diffraction pattern is then binarized according to its real part value. The resultant BAM can be represented as follows:
where Re{ } denotes the real part, and the subscript b means a pattern after binarization. Before being separated into two BAMs for optically secured verification, H b (x , y ) is further compressed from the input data to construct a new BAM H s b (x , y ) with a certain sparsity level H
where the operator represents a random pixel extraction algorithm, by which a few pixels with the values 0 or 1 are randomly extracted [29] - [31] . It should be note that, before proceeding on to the generation of two BAMs and optical reconstruction step, an appropriate percentage of pixels extracted from H b in fact should be determined for the compressed BAM H s b to make sure that neither of the two designed BAMs has unintentional information disclosure. This will be discussed in the following section in detail. H s b (x , y ) described in (4) can then be separated into two components by using a computer-generated binary matrix M 1 and its complementary matrix M 2 , each of whose entries independently takes the value 0 with probability 1/2. Thus, the desired two BAMs can be obtained by performing the following element-wise multiplication:
where i = 1, 2 and the coordinates are omitted for simplicity, and H s b is a sparse representation of H b .
By substituting (5) in (1), we obtain the interference pattern f s (x, y), which should not visually render the primary information as designed but can be verified. Therefore, to achieve a good verification performance and to ensure security of the secret data, an appropriate percentage of pixels extracted from BAM H b should be determined for the compressed BAM H s b , from which the two BAMs B 1 , B 2 are generated.
To authenticate the reconstructed image f s (x, y), we compare it with the original image f (x, y) based on a nonlinear correlation algorithm [8] - [10] , [17] , [29] - [31] . In this paper, the peak-tocorrelation energy (PCE) ratio is employed to indicate the sharpness and height of the correlation peak [8] .
Results and Discussion
Numerical simulation results are presented to demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method. Fig. 2(a) shows the secret data used as a reference, which has the size of 500 × 500 pixels. The pixel size is 10 μm square. The illumination wavelength λ and the reconstruction distance d adopted in the experimental evaluation are set at 632.8 nm and 8 cm, respectively. We first generate the compressed BAM H s b with 5.5% of the pixel size of its original, i.e., the binarized Fresnel diffraction pattern H b , and then separate it into two highly compressed BAMs B 1 and B 2 , which are shown in Fig. 2(b) and (c), respectively.
The individual reconstruction of each BAM and the desired diffraction pattern f s coherently reconstructed from the two BAMs are demonstrated in Fig. 3(a)-(c) , respectively. The visually unrecognizability of reconstructions provides an additional layer of security for authentication. Nevertheless, the reconstructed images may still be reliably identified when containing sufficient data related to the secret image. When comparing them with the secret image individually with the strength of applied nonlinearity 0.3, we obtain the nonlinear correlation (NC) surfaces, which are illustrated in Fig. 3(d)-(f) , respectively. Each of the two BAMs doesn't contain sufficient data for verifying as shown in Fig. 3(d) and (e). Nevertheless, one sharp peak can be observed superimposed on a noise background in Fig. 3(f) , which, in fact, implies the two BAMs have been authenticated.
The BAMs are determined only by the secret image itself; thus, it is impossible for one to obtain those BAMs from a different image. Simulations show that the resulting signals will not be passed through the authentication system if one applies an incorrect key for one of the BAMs. For brevity, only one example shown in Fig. 4 is provided for illustration, for which B2 has been replaced by a binary matrix whose entries takes the value 1 with probability 1/2. As mentioned in previous section, an appropriate percentage of pixels extracted from H b in fact should be determined for the compressed BAM H s b to ensuring the safety of the two BAMs. In the following, we will explain how the two BAMs are computed.
The correlation coefficient (CC) [2] - [4] is a popular way of summarizing a scatter plot into a single number between -1 and 1. Here, we apply it to determine how closely two images are similar.
The CC values between the three reconstructions and the primary image (y axis) are respectively plotted against the percentage of pixels extracted for H s b (x axis), whereby we find the same trend as observed in Fig. 5(a) . As the CC values generally increasing with increased percentage of extracted pixels, the reconstructions are considerably more and more close to the original. A high CC value could result in information disclosure in reconstructions. Therefore, it is possible to roughly estimate the maximum percentage of extracted pixels for H s b that is allowed. Reconstruction examples corresponding to the percentage values 9%, 12.5% and 15% are, respectively, shown in Fig. 6(a)-(c) , which still contain a great deal of information about the secret image. More numerical simulations show that the approximate maximum percentage of the extracted pixels for H s b with ability to authenticate BAMs without disclosing secret data is about 8%, and the CC for this data is 0.134.
After determining the maximum percentage value for a secure authentication, we then evaluate the authentication performance of the proposed method. Fig. 5(b) shows the three PCE curves with respect to the percentage value. In general, the tendencies are similar to those of the CC curves. Thus, that a smaller percentage value of extracted pixels yields the degradation of the reconstructions is the reason for the decrease in PCE (and the deterioration of NC surface). Compared with the PCE curves of the two images individually reconstructed from the two BAMs, the PCE curve of the interference pattern ascends more rapidly. It is interesting to note that all the PCE curves rise along a zigzag path, which is due to coherent superposition and the random pixel extraction for BAMs. This interesting feature enables us to make better choices in BAM generation since the PCE values of the interference pattern are much larger than that of the diffraction patterns of the two BAMs with some percentage values, especially at curve maxima. Thus, it is possible to correctly authenticate the reconstruction using two BAMs with larger compression. This has been verified with simulation results illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3 .
There are still many values of the percentage for which it is possible to yield a double-BAM structure for authentication, for example, 4.0% and 6.5%. In the same manner, we can obtain two BAMs and calculate the resultant NC surfaces, which are illustrated in pictorial form in Fig. 7 .
Regardless of the values of the NC surfaces, it is worth pointing out that those results shown in Fig. 7 reveal the reliability of the proposed authentication approach once again.
Conclusion
In this paper, a new method for optically secured verification has been presented and validated. The input secret image are numerically encoded into two highly compressed BAMs (instead of compressed phase masks), from which the image coherently constructed is visibly unrecognizable but comprises sufficient information for verification via optical image correlation approach. No valuable information about the secret image can be acquired from the two BAMs, as well as from their respective diffraction patterns. In addition to the data security provided by the system described in the paper, it is a simple matter also to provide high compression for the authenticable data for data storage capacity and transmission reasons.
